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Abstract 
 
To increase the opportunities for poor ethnic minorities to benefit from economic 
growth the government of Vietnam implemented one of the biggest poverty reduction 
programs entitled ‘Socio-economic Development for the Communes Facing Greatest 
Hardships in the Ethnic Minority and Mountainous Areas’ during 2006 - 2010. This 
paper estimates the program’s impacts on households in the project areas. We find that 
the program had positive impacts on several important outcomes of the ethnic minority 
households, including productive asset ownership, household durables ownership, and 
rice productivity. Positive impacts were also recorded for agricultural income, 
household total income, and household per-capita income. A particularly important 
result is that poverty among minority households in treatment communes declined 
significantly more than it declined in comparison communes. Finally, ethnic minority 
households enjoyed a reduction in travel time to health facilities, relative to households 
in control communes. 
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1. Introduction 
Vietnam is one of the most successful countries in the world in terms of poverty 
reduction and economic achievement over the past twenty years. The poverty rate fell 
from 58 percent in 1993 to around 14 percent by 2008.2 However, the rate of poverty 
reduction has slowed down over time and the gap between the rich and poor is 
continuing to increase. Poor households in some regions gain much less from economic 
growth than better-off households. Most of the households which are still below the 
poverty line in Vietnam live in remote rural areas which are mainly populated by ethnic 
minorities. The share of ethnic minorities in the poorest 10 percent of the population 
has risen to 65 percent (World Bank, 2012). 
To increase the opportunities for poor households of specific groups and regions 
to benefit from economic growth the government has introduced many targeted 
programs. The most important poverty reduction program for poor and ethnic 
minorities in the most remote and difficult areas is entitled ‘Socio-economic 
Development for the Communes Facing Greatest Hardships in the Ethnic Minority and 
Mountainous Areas,’ commonly known as Program 135 (P135). The first phase of the 
program was implemented during 2001-2005. The second phase of the program (P135-
II) was implemented between 2006 and 2010. P135-II targeted 1,600 communes in  
poor and mountainous areas in 45 provinces; these areas are characterized by large 
proportions of ethnic minority households and they have persistently high poverty rates. 
The program delivers mainly public goods through four components: basic 
infrastructure development, improved and market-oriented agricultural production, 
improved socio-cultural lives through better access to social services, and capacity 
building for State officials. Moreover, the design of P135-II incorporated sound 
methodology for impact evaluation. The total budget of P135-II was approximately 1.1 
billion USD. Program implementation involved several ministries, but The State 
Committee for Ethnic Minority Affairs (CEMA) was the standing organization which 
coordinated and supervised the program’s activities. 
A large number of studies report impact evaluations of poverty reduction 
programs in Vietnam. For example, using Vietnam household surveys, Van de Walle 
(2002) and Van Den Berg and Nguyen (2011) measure the effects of social protection 
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programs. They find that the social protection programs can help the beneficiaries to 
increase consumption and reduce poverty. Nguyen (2008) examines the effect of a 
micro-credit program on poverty, and find a positive effect of micro-credit on 
household consumption. The impact of free health insurance for the poor is assessed by 
Bales et al. (2007) and Wagstaff (2009).  Van de Walle and Cratty (2002) and Mu and 
Van de Walle (2007) found that rural road rehabilitation projects improved local 
markets, small businesses, service availability, and trade activities in the project areas. 
Nguyen (2011) found that rural roads helped rural households increase income, 
consumption, and working hours of household members. Khandker et al. (2009) 
investigate the impact of a World Bank financed Rural Electrification project (REI) on 
welfare of households in project areas.. They find that grid electrification from the 
project has significant positive impacts on households’ cash income, expenditure and 
educational outcomes.  
Quantitative evidence on large-scale national poverty reduction programs in 
Vietnam is limited.3 Efforts to conduct quantitative impact evaluation of large-scale 
poverty reduction programs may face several challenges. First, impact evaluation is 
often an after-thought and projects are launched and completed without baseline 
surveys having been conducted. Second, poverty reduction is a long-term objective, and 
long after project completion policy makers might have lost interest in evaluating the 
project or funding might not be available for conducting an evaluation. Third, project 
beneficiaries may not have been randomly selected or the method of selection may not 
have been documented at all. This may be especially damaging if political issues were 
at play in selecting beneficiaries: purposeful selection can bias estimated project 
impacts. Fourth, it is often the case that several development projects and programs 
simultaneously provide support for disadvantaged people in a given area. Some 
households and villages, both participants and non-participants in a given project, can 
participate in several other projects. Even households that do not participate in any 
projects may enjoy beneficial general equilibrium effects; households that participate in 
a few projects may benefit indirectly from spillover effects of projects in which they do 
not participate.  
                                                        
3
  MOLISA (2004) and UNDP and MOLISA, (2009) conducted qualitative impact assessments of the 
two largest national projects on poverty reduction, the National Targeted Program for Poverty Reduction 
and P-135. 
 4 
In this study we measure the effects of P135-II on economic outcomes of 
households in project areas, focusing mainly on poverty status, income, agricultural 
production, housing conditions, and access to basic public services. We are able to 
observe the selection criteria of most commune projects and to obtain high-quality 
panel data on treatment and control households. Our study contributes a case study to 
the literature on impact evaluation of large complex programs. Findings from the study 
are also useful to the government of Vietnam and to international organizations 
involved in designing the third phase of Program 135.    
The paper includes six sections. The second section provides details of the data 
sets: the baseline and end-line surveys. The third section reviews P135-II and describes 
the poverty profiles and livelihoods of households in the project areas. The fourth 
section presents the methodology used to measure the program impacts. It analyses the 
implementation process and discusses issues that arose during implementation that 
could affect the methodology used for measuring the program impacts. Finally, section 
six concludes.  
 
2. Data Sets 
This study relies on the 2007 Baseline Survey of P135-II (abbreviated as BLS 2007) 
and the 2012 End-line Survey of P135-II (abbreviated as BLS 2012). The two surveys 
covered communes and households in treatment and control communes before and after 
the implementation of P135-II. 
A common challenge in impact evaluation is accounting for the actual sampling 
design of the control and treatment groups in cases where they were not randomly 
selected: many interventions deliberately target the most disadvantaged groups. The 
target communes of P135-II were the poorest and most remote communes and their 
selection was based on their poverty rates and lack of key infrastructure to support 
agricultural production. The quantifiable criteria for identifying P135-II communes 
were based on the following indicators. First, lack of at least 4 of 7 key items:  roads 
suitable for cars to travel to central communes; at least 50% of agricultural land being 
irrigated; presence of a health center; presence of a school; presence of a market; 
availability of electricity; at least 50% of villages in the commune have access to clean 
water. Second, a commune-level poverty rate higher than 30% based on the poverty 
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line for the year 2000 or higher than 55% based on the poverty line of 2006. In practice, 
selection for treatment was based mainly on the poverty rate.  From among 2,359 
communes that were targeted by P135-I 1,632 communes were selected for P135-II.  
Based on the availability of resources and the data requirements for identifying 
and precisely estimating changes in key indicators (poverty and income), we 
determined that a sample of 6,000 households would be adequate. Sample households 
were selected from 400 communes, of which 266 were treatment communes and 134 
were control communes. From the list of 1,632 communes in P135-II provided by 
CEMA, 266 treatment communes were randomly drawn. This selection process ensured 
that the sample treatment communes were selected from all over the provinces included 
in P135-II. In fact, 42 out of 45 P135-II provinces were included in the sample.4  
The selection of control communes was rather more complicated. We needed to 
find communes which were as similar as possible to the sampled treatment communes, 
and to control for participation in the first phase of P135. Thus, we started with the 727 
communes that had ‘graduated’ from P135 as the population of control communes from 
which the sample would be drawn.5 Data for 727 graduated communes and the 266 
treatment communes were pooled and a probit regression model was used to estimate 
the probability that each was selected for P135-II, based on key characteristics of each 
commune (poverty, key infrastructure, and population). The graduated communes with 
estimated selection probabilities higher than the average were identified as potential 
communes for the control group.  From among these, 134 communes for the control 
group were selected randomly. 
Simple t-tests were used to examine the quality of sample selection. As Table 
A1 in the appendix shows, the control and treatment communes displayed no 
significant differences in key indicators that had been used as the criteria for selection 
into P135-II, except for the presence of electricity. The distributions of commune 
households across Vietnam’s eight geographic/topographic regions are also similar. 
This provides evidence that the sampling design is good for measuring the impact of 
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P135-I. 
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P135-II. Also of interest in Table A1 is the degree to which the sample communes are 
on average isolated from markets and the degree to which they lack evidence of official 
attention through culture houses, media stations, and peoples’ committee houses. 
The Agriculture Census of 2006 was used as the sampling frame for selecting 
the survey households. Using this data set ensured that we were working with the most 
current lists of households in the 400 selected communes. Survey households were 
selected in two steps. The first step was to select one sample village from each sample 
commune using the probability proportional to population sampling method (PPS). This 
selection method was applied for both control and treatment groups. The second step 
was to select sample households. To ensure that the survey covered 6,000 households, 
we first selected randomly 20 households from the list of all households in each 
selected village and then we selected randomly 15 households out of 20 households for 
official interviews. The five remaining households served as reserves for replacement 
in cases where the initially-selected households were not available for the official 
interview for any reason.  
Two questionnaires were used in these surveys: one for the household and one 
the commune. The household questionnaire collected detailed information about 
various aspects of each household’s socio-economic conditions. It included 
demographic attributes, migration, education, health, agriculture, off-farm and non-
farm employment, borrowing and saving, remittances, insurance and assets. Questions 
about to P135-II were also included in a special module which was designed to collect 
information about program implementation at the grass-root level, including household 
awareness of elements of P135-II, household participation in the selection, supervision, 
and implementation of projects under P135-II, and the household’s assessment of the 
quality of the P135-II projects. 
Tablet PCs were used for data entry during the ELS 2012 interviews.  This was 
the first time this technology had been applied for such a large and complicated survey 
in Vietnam. Using tablet computers minimized non-sampling errors normally 
associated with data entry and ensured very high-quality data. The tablet technology 
incorporated survey software applications, GPS, and internet capabilities to ensure that 
the data were collected in the most accurate possible fashion, in the shortest time, with 
the best quality control. The data were entered directly during the interview instead of 
using a paper questionnaire. With 3G-internet capability, the entered data was 
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transmitted directly back to an online server for immediate data checking. This 
procedure eliminated the data entry stage and increased the efficiency of data cleaning. 
Figure 1 shows the GPS-determined locations at which teams completed interviews 
from the beginning to the mid-point of the survey period.  
We were able to construct panel data on 5,668 households. The attrition rate 
from BLS 2007 was about 5.2% after 5 years, which was much lower than the attrition 
rate experienced by VHLSS, partly reflecting the lower rates of migration in the remote 
areas and the careful logistical arrangements of the survey teams. 
 Figure 1: Locations at of P135-II End-line Survey Areas 
 
Source: Authors’ preparation. 
3. Income and Poverty Profiles of P135-II Treatment Communes 
With the lessons learned from P135-I and other poverty reduction programs, and with 
the technical support of UNDP, P135-II was the first large, and most ambitious, 
program targeted on ethnic minorities and remote areas. The main objectives of P135-II 
were: (i) to reduce the commune-level poverty rates to below 30%; (ii) to ensure that 
more than 70% of each commune’s households have annual income per capita higher 
than 3.5 million VND; (iii) to improve agricultural productivity of the main crops in 
each commune; (iv) to increase the net primary school enrollment rate to at least 95%; 
(v) to increase the net lower secondary school enrollment rate to at least 75%. 
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In order to achieve these objectives, P135- II included four major components: 
(i) agricultural production support through training in new production practices; (ii) 
support to develop local infrastructure and improve household access to that 
infrastructure; (iii) improvement of socio-cultural life and access to public services; (iv) 
capacity strengthening through training local government officials in administrative 
management, public investment management, and operations management. 
Table 1 presents incomes and poverty rates of households in P135-II treatment 
communes. The first column of Table 1 shows the estimated population share of each 
group to provide context for the remaining columns in Table 1 and for the remaining 
tables in this section. Real per capita income of households in these communes 
increased by 21 percent during 2007-2012. This rate is lower than the income growth 
rate at the national level. According to VHLSS 2006 and 2010, real per capita income 
increased by 50 percent during 2006-2010; average per capita household income 
increased to 16.6 million VND by 2010. 
 
Table 1: Per capita income and poverty rates of households in treatment communes. 
Groups 
% Share 
in Pop 
Per capita income (thousand VND) Poverty rate (%) 
2007 2012 % Change 2007 2012 Change 
All households 100 6,039 7,295 21 57.5 49.2 -8.2 
Ethnicity  
      
Kinh  14.2 9,274 11,378 23 34.3 32.0 -2.3 
Ethnic minorities 85.8 5,210 6,294 21 63.4 53.5 -10.0 
Ethnic minority groups 
      
Tày 11.2 5,916 7,353 24 57.9 43.7 -14.3 
Thái 9.7 5,181 5,102 - 2 59.6 62.9 3.3 
Mường 6.7 6,787 7,455 10 48.3 48.3 0.0 
Nùng 5.5 5,801 7,723 33 59.8 41.5 -18.3 
H'Mông 18.0 3,306 5,001 51 83.5 59.2 -24.3 
Dao 11.8 5,022 5,776 15 63.0 55.9 -7.1 
Other minorities 23.0 5,863 7,111 21 58.1 50.7 -7.3 
Gender of household head 
      
Male 86.5 5,763 7,024 22 58.8 50.5 -8.4 
Female 13.5 9,101 10,119 11 42.8 36.6 -6.1 
Age of household head 
      
Below 25 8.6 5,891 6,667 13 71.7 56.9 -14.7 
26-35 31.1 5,035 6,284 25 65.1 57.4 -7.7 
35-45 29.2 5,684 7,308 29 56.2 45.3 -10.9 
46-60 23.7 7,445 8,741 17 48.5 40.2 -8.4 
Above 60 7.4 6,323 7,005 11 55.4 57.1 1.7 
Regions  
      
North 63.1 5,084 6,551 29 65.2 50.7 -14.6 
Central 30.5 6,132 7,284 19 56.1 54.3 -1.8 
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Groups 
% Share 
in Pop 
Per capita income (thousand VND) Poverty rate (%) 
2007 2012 % Change 2007 2012 Change 
South 6.4 8,713 9,608 10 36.7 38.2 1.5 
Note:  Real income per capita is measured at January 2012 prices; the price indices used were regional price 
indices provided by the General Statistics Office. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the BLS 2007 and ELS 2012.  
               All estimates account for complex sample design. 
Among the households in P135-II treatment communes, Kinh households have 
substantially higher incomes than ethnic minorities have, which is consistent with the 
large income gaps found between the Kinh and ethnic minorities in most studies on 
poverty in Vietnam (e.g., World Bank, 2012). Except for Thai and Muong, the ethnic 
minorities in P135-II treatment communes experienced increases in per capita income. 
The two ethnic minorities with the lowest per-capita incomes in 2012 were the H’Mong 
and Thai. The H’Mong experienced a very high rate of income growth, but the Thai 
incomes actually declined.  
In this study, poverty is defined based on per capita income compared to the 
official income poverty line, which was 2.4 million VND per person per year in 2006 
prices. We adjusted this poverty line to 2007 and 2012 prices for the calculations shown 
in Table 1. Table 1 shows that the overall poverty rate decreased from 57.5 percent to 
49.2 percent during the study period, with  the largest declines among ethnic minorities, 
though the Muong and Thai showed no improvement.  
Table 1 also shows income and poverty rates by gender of the household head, 
by age group of the household head, and by broad geographic region within Vietnam.6 
While it may at first be surprising that female-headed households enjoyed higher 
incomes and lower poverty rates than male-headed households, this is often explained 
by the fact that working-age males migrated to urban areas or foreign countries and 
contributed remittances to the households. Adult women who have stayed behind claim 
“household head” status for purposes of the survey.  Income generally increased and 
the poverty rate generally decreased with age of the household head, except for the 
youngest and oldest age groups.  Finally, moving from the North to the South of 
Vietnam we see large income increases and sharp decreases in the poverty rates. 
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not include expenditure data. The income data were constructed from information on income, 
remittances, household enterprise revenue and cost, and very detailed information on costs and revenues 
associated with crop and livestock production. The sampled households are not subject to income 
taxation so there is no incentive to under-report for this reason. 
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While the poverty rate simply records the proportion of households living below 
a given poverty line, the poverty gap index and the poverty severity index measure the 
intensity of poverty.7 The poverty gap and severity indexes presented in Table 2 give a 
more in-depth picture of the poverty experienced by the sampled households. 
According to Table 2 there was substantial variation in the poverty gap and poverty 
severity among ethnic minorities.  Table 2 indicates some large changes in these 
poverty indexes during the period 2007-2012 including substantial increases for Thai 
and Muong households. For Thai and Muong households poverty became more severe, 
with their poor households living even farther below the poverty line in 2012 than in 
2007. On the other hand, the gap between poor H’Mong households and the poverty 
line had narrowed by 2012.  
 
Table 2: Poverty gap and severity indexes by demographics and region. 
Groups 
Poverty gap index (%) Poverty severity index (%) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
All households 23.5 22.4 -1.1 12.5 13.4 0.9 
Ethnicity  
      
Kinh  11.7 13.3 1.5 6.0 8.0 2.1 
Ethnic minorities 26.5 24.6 -1.9 14.2 14.7 0.5 
Ethnic minority groups 
      
Tày 22.3 18.1 -4.3 11.5 10.2 -1.3 
Thái 26.0 32.1 6.1 14.2 20.9 6.7 
Mường 16.8 23.5 6.7 7.4 15.2 7.9 
Nùng 22.2 17.8 -4.4 10.9 9.9 -1.0 
H'Mông 37.8 26.0 -11.8 20.4 14.5 -5.9 
Dao 22.7 24.0 1.2 11.4 13.5 2.1 
Other ethnic minorities 24.9 23.8 -1.1 14.0 14.4 0.4 
Gender of household head 
      
Male 23.9 23.0 -0.9 12.7 13.8 1.2 
Female 18.5 15.3 -3.3 10.5 8.7 -1.8 
Age of household head 
      
Below 25 30.0 26.4 -3.5 15.8 15.1 -0.8 
26-35 27.2 25.5 -1.7 14.5 15.4 0.9 
35-45 23.8 21.0 -2.7 12.8 12.3 -0.5 
46-60 18.5 17.8 -0.8 9.6 10.7 1.1 
Above 60 21.0 27.6 6.5 11.5 17.8 6.3 
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(Introduction to Poverty Analysis, World Bank, 2005).  
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Groups 
Poverty gap index (%) Poverty severity index (%) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
Regions 
      
North 27.1 22.0 -5.1 14.4 12.5 -1.9 
Central 23.5 27.3 3.8 12.7 17.5 4.7 
South 12.9 17.0 4.0 6.8 10.8 4.0 
Note:  Income per capita is measured in the price of January 2012. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the BLS 2007 and ELS 2012. 
               All estimates account for complex sample design. 
 
In Table 2 patterns related to gender and age of the household head mimic those 
in Table 1: female-headed households are better-off than male-headed households and 
the intensity of poverty generally diminishes as the age of the household head rises, 
except for the very highest age groups. The indexes seem to indicate that the North has 
seen more progress in ameliorating the severity of poverty than has been the  case in the 
Central or Southern parts of the country.  
Possession of productive assets and income diversification play important roles 
in sustainable poverty reduction. Table 3 shows that households in P135-II areas rely 
largely on agricultural income; crops and livestock are the main contributors (see Table 
4). However, there does seem to be an incipient transition from farm to wage activities: 
the share of agriculture in household income decreased from 64% in 2007 to 57% in 
2012, while the share of wage income increased from 20% to 24%. 
 
Table 3: Household income structure.  
Household Income 
Household income  
(thousand VND/year) 
Income share (%) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
Total  29,443 34,096 4,653 100 100 0.00 
Wage income 6,403 10,000 3,597 20 24 4 
Agriculture 16,688 17,464 776 64 57 -6 
Non-farm, non-wage 2,707 2,521 -186 5 5 0 
Others 3,645 4,110 465 12 14 2 
Note:  Income per capita is measured in the price of January 2012. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the BLS 2007 and ELS 2012. 
                All estimates account for complex sample design. 
 
Table 4: Shares of income from agriculture, forestry and aquaculture (%). 
Source 2007 2012 Change 
Agriculture 100 100 
 
 12 
Crops 64 68 4 
Livestock 16 16 -0.15 
Agricultural services 0.13 0.21 0.08 
Forestry 15 12 -3.70 
Aquaculture 4 4 -0.39 
Note :  Income per capita is measured in the price of January 2012. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the BLS 2007 and ELS 2012. 
               All estimates account for complex sample design. 
 
Table 5 examines wage income in more detail. The proportion of households 
having wages (from either long-term or short-term work) increased from 47.7 percent 
in 2007 to 53.7 percent in 2012; wage income of the poor mainly comes mainly from 
short-term or seasonal work. Kinh and non-poor households are more likely to have 
wages than ethnic minority and poor households. However, this gap is relatively small. 
Although the proportion of households having wage income was rather high for most 
ethnic minority groups, the share of wages in total income remained low for some, such 
as Tay, H’Mong, and Dao. Moving from North to South both the share of households 
earning wage income and the shares of wage income in total income increase sharply. 
 
Table 5: Wage income. 
Groups 
Households having wage income 
(%) 
Share of wage income in total income 
(%) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
       
Total 47.7 53.7 6.0 19.5 23.9 4.4 
Poor/Non-poor 
      
Poor 41.0 51.4 10.4 14.9 22.4 7.5 
Non-poor 55.2 56.2 1.0 24.9 26.5 1.6 
Ethnicity 
      
Kinh 56.5 63.8 7.3 27.7 35.7 8.0 
Ethnic minorities 44.9 50.5 5.5 17.1 20.9 3.7 
Ethnic minorities 
      
Tày 47.7 46.8 -0.9 14.4 16.3 1.9 
Thái 35.8 50.4 14.7 11.4 20.2 8.8 
Mường 59.2 55.3 -3.9 23.2 25.2 2.0 
Nùng 48.6 47.6 -1.0 14.2 17.8 3.6 
H'Mông 26.3 44.1 17.8 5.4 8.3 2.9 
Dao 36.9 40.4 3.4 8.1 14.6 6.5 
Others 57.0 58.2 1.2 30.1 32.4 2.3 
Regions 
      
North 38.5 46.1 7.6 11.2 15.7 4.5 
Central 48.1 55.8 7.7 19.2 24.2 5.0 
South 69.6 69.5 -0.1 41.1 46.4 5.3 
Income per capita is measured in the price of January 2012. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the BLS 2007 and ELS 2012. 
                All estimates account for complex sample design. 
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Since opportunities for long-term wage employment are limited in the poor 
areas, non-farm activities can be an important way to increase in productivity and 
income and reduce poverty. Non-farm production has been found to be an effective 
way to increase income and reduce poverty for rural households in developing 
countries (e.g., Lanjouw and Lanjouw 1995; Lanjouw 1998, Ruben and Van Den Berg 
2001). In Vietnam, 35 percent of households had income from non-farm activities 
(excluding wages) in 2010 (according the 2010 VHLSS). Yet, in P135-II communes, 
the proportion of households having non-farm income decreased from 23.6 percent in 
2007 to 13.6 percent in 2012. The poor and ethnic minorities derive very little income 
from non-farm production. The share of non-farm non-wage income in total income 
was only 5 percent. 
 
Table 6: Nonfarm income (excluding wages). 
Groups 
Households having nonfarm 
income (%) 
Share of nonfarm income in total 
income (%) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
       
Total 23.6 13.6 -10.1 5.3 4.7 -0.6 
Poor/Non-poor 
      
Poor 15.6 6.7 -8.9 2.2 1.6 -0.6 
Non-poor 32.6 21.2 -11.4 8.9 8.4 -0.5 
Ethnicity 
      
Kinh 31.4 28.0 -3.4 11.3 12.7 1.3 
Ethnic minorities 21.2 9.0 -12.2 3.5 2.5 -1.1 
Ethnic minorities 
      
Tày 24.2 6.2 -18.0 3.8 1.7 -2.1 
Thái 19.6 9.5 -10.1 3.3 1.6 -1.7 
Mường 19.3 12.2 -7.1 3.9 3.8 -0.1 
Nùng 21.5 4.1 -17.4 3.8 1.5 -2.3 
H'Mông 24.7 4.2 -20.6 2.1 0.4 -1.6 
Dao 33.6 3.6 -30.0 2.4 0.8 -1.6 
Others 15.3 14.6 -0.7 4.6 4.7 0.1 
Regions 
      
North 25.9 7.2 -18.7 3.5 1.7 -1.8 
Central 13.0 11.0 -2.0 3.7 2.9 -0.7 
South 30.4 31.9 1.4 11.9 15.0 3.1 
Note: Income per capita is measured in the price of January 2012. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the BLS 2007 and ELS 2012. 
               All estimates account for complex sample design. 
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4. Impact Evaluation Methodology 
In this section we discuss the treatment and control communes, examine their program 
and non-program budget allocations, and describe our household-level impact 
estimation strategy. As noted in the introduction the treatment consists of public goods 
development at the commune level so our methodology delivers estimates of Intention 
to Treat (ITT) effects rather than Average Treatment Effects (ATE) at the household 
level.  
4.1. Definitions of treatment and control groups 
Commune eligibility for P135-II was initially determined in 2006. However, between 
2006 and 2012 some communes that had originally been among the control communes 
were brought into the program and others that had been in the program advanced 
sufficiently to be graduated from it at various points during the study period. Changes 
in treatment status introduce ambiguity into the definitions of treatment and control 
groups for use in impact analysis. We experimented with three mechanisms to deal with 
that ambiguity. First we used each commune’s initial status in 2006; second, we used 
each commune’s final status in 2012; finally, we dropped all 53 communes that ever 
experienced a change in status. Preliminary analysis indicated the three approaches 
yield similar results, so we opted for the third, which is conceptually the cleanest. 
As discussed in the introduction, a given commune may host more than one 
poverty reduction program. The potential impact of any given program may depend on 
the degree to which it is enhanced by the availability of other programs. However, in 
the present case a rather different issue came to light. The possibility that authorities 
shifted non-P135 funds away from P135-II communes and allocated them to non-P135-
II communes to compensate the latter for exclusion from P135 was raised by 
individuals in the field; our data provide some indirect evidence on this possibility. 
The 2007 and 2012 commune questionnaires solicited data on commune 
economic development projects and their funding. Comparison and treatment 
communes all received some P135 funding (keep in mind that our control and treatment 
communes had all participated in P135-I).  The data do not distinguish between P135-I 
and P135-II, but projects undertaken in more recent years are likely to have been 
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funded by P135-II, thus we focus on projects undertaken during 2006 – 2012.  We 
calculated cumulative net funding for 2006 – 2012; funds for projects ending after 2012 
were pro-rated to estimate the expenditures up to 2012.8 Average cumulative funding 
across communes is displayed in Table 7. 
While the treatment communes did receive substantially more P135 funds than 
comparison communes, they also received less non-P135 funds.  The averages of funds 
received by comparison and treatment communes from all sources are statistically 
indistinguishable. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis of compensatory 
reallocation of non-P135 funds by the authorities. The majority of projects recorded for 
section 5 of the commune questionnaire are infrastructure projects.   
Table 7: Budget allocations of control and treatment communes. 
Fund Source 
Control Communes Average Treatment Communes Average 
000 VND n 000 VND n 
P135 2,047,862 98 3,322,755 245 
Other 5,845,986 98 4,586,976 245 
All Sources 7,983,848 98 7,909,731 245 
Population 3,863 98 4,025 245 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2007 and 2012 commune surveys. The average populations 
are not statistically significantly different (p-value = 0.68). Total populations in our control and 
treatment communes were 378,614 and 994,163, respectively. 
Under the assumption that the impact of infrastructure funding is independent of 
funding source, statistically identifying the impact of P135-II on household response 
variables may be difficult. However, as we see below, we are able to attribute 
statistically significant impacts to P135-II.  
                                                        
8
 Amounts were net of local contributions; ten outliers were omitted. 
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4.2 Methodology to measure impacts 
Some elements of the impact evaluation framework are illustrated by the simple causal 
chain hypothesis given in Figure 2 on the next page. Clearly, outcomes like household 
income and the educations of household members are determined by much more 
complex mechanisms than are indicated here.  Nonetheless, the simple causal chain 
helps organize our work. 
Commune leader and household member perceptions are readily available from 
the commune and household surveys.  Four elements of P135-II are given in the third 
row of the figure:  commune infrastructure, agricultural production, capacity building, 
and social capital. Linking impacts to those inputs is straightforward because the 
questionnaires follow up on household members’ employment on infrastructure 
projects, household receipt of agricultural inputs or services, participation of commune 
leaders in capacity building exercises, and individuals’ participation in social capital 
building exercises. For example, in 2007 49% of households in treatment communes 
participated in community meetings to select infrastructure projects; this rate rose to 
74% in the 2012 survey.   
Figure 2:  Causal Chain Hypothesis 
 17 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
 
 
 
While many households provide volunteer labor for infrastructure projects, the 
projects also provide opportunities for earning wages. Over the study period the 
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proportion of households earning wages for work on commune infrastructure projects 
increased from 4.4% to 9.1%.  Finally, households reported whether they directly 
benefitted from infrastructure projects. The proportion indicating “yes” increased from 
85% to 95% over the study period. 
Higher-level outcomes like production, income, and education are driven by 
more complex mechanisms and are affected by a wide variety of commune and 
household-specific variables. For these outcomes we rely on econometric tools to 
identify and estimate program impacts. Econometric impact evaluation requires a 
model to link each outcome with a set of explanatory variables and an estimation 
strategy that exploits the panel data feature of the data set.  We discuss our econometric 
models in the next sub-section.   
 
Econometric model 
The model is summarized by the equation given below.  The subscripts designate the 
following:  c = commune, i = household, t = time period.  Notice that the treatment is at 
the commune level, not at the household level.  The question of self-selection at the 
household level does not arise in this case. Self-selection might occur at the commune 
level if communes lobby for inclusion or embrace P135-II with varying degrees of 
enthusiasm.  Certainly, we have non-random assignment of treatment at the commune 
level: if assignment to treatment were based on exogenous regressors (but not on 
unobservables), then that could easily be controlled by including those exogenous 
regressors.   
 =   + 
 +   +   +   +   +   +         (1) 
where: 
 Outcome variable 
 Treatment indicator 
 Vector of time-varying observable household characteristics 
 Vector of time-varying observable commune characteristics 
 Time-invariant commune characteristics (may include unobservables) 
 Time-invariant household characteristics (may include unobservables) 
 Time-specific effect 
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 Idiosyncratic household deviations from expectation 

 Impact of Treatment on households with  = 0  
 
We estimated model (1) using household fixed effects regression to control for the non-
time-varying unobservables in  and . The estimator 
 is the difference-in-
differences estimator with controls. 
 The possibility exists that spillovers could flow from treatment communes to 
control communes. However, communes in poor and remote areas tend to have large 
areas, poor transportation, and low population densities. Thus we expect that the spill-
over effects would be negligible. 
 The assumption that  is exogenous requires some discussion. While we know 
that the primary criterion for a commune’s assignment to treatment was its poverty rate, 
we also note that the poverty rate would be endogenous for most of the response 
variables we consider. Thus, we substitute determinants of the poverty rate (they are 
among the elements of  and ) and take equation (1) as a “partial” reduced form 
equation; “partial” in the sense that we have substituted exogenous determinants for the 
endogenous poverty rate, but we recognize that assignment to treatment may still be 
related to some unobservable productivity effects. If these unobservable productivity 
effects are negatively related to assignment to treatment, then assignment to treatment 
is endogenous. Furthermore, if the unobservable productivity effects are positively 
related to the response variables of interest, the estimated treatment effect will be 
downward biased. If this is the case, our estimated impacts may be considered as 
“conservative.”  Potential endogeneity of assignment to treatment is the subject of 
ongoing work. 
 
5. Impact Estimation Results 
Higher level outcomes appear in the lower part of the causal chain illustration presented 
in Figure 2. In this section we define several key response variables and report the 
estimated impacts of P135-II on them. These include measures of agricultural 
production, household income, household poverty status, and so on. We focus heavily 
on measures of agricultural productivity because important elements of P135-II target 
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agricultural productivity. Detailed definitions of the key response variables are 
presented in the appendix 
Control variables for the household income regressions include: education and 
education squared of the best-educated working-age member of the household; age, age 
squared, and gender of the household head; size of the household; total land area held 
by the household; annual remittances received by the household; an indicator for the 
number of negative shocks experienced by the household during the past few years; and 
a dummy variable for the year (2007 or 2012).  Working age is defined as 15 ≤ age ≤ 
65 for both men and women. We ran separate regressions for minority and non-
minority households.  
Estimation results are given in Table 8 below.9 Estimated P135-II impact 
appears in columns headed by DID FE/X (difference-in-differences, fixed-effects, with 
controls).  T-ratios for the hypothesis that the impact is no greater than zero are given, 
as are one-tail p-values for testing that hypothesis.  Impacts are given for minority and 
non-minority households.  The panels on the right-hand side of the table show the 
sample average values of the outcome variables, which are helpful for interpreting the 
estimated impacts.   
It is essential to keep in mind the role of the counterfactual (control communes) 
for interpreting the estimated impacts. For example, the estimated impact on asset index 
for minorities is 0.38.  However, the sample means show the following: between 2007 
and 2012 the asset index among comparison households decreased from 2.43 to 2.09 (in 
2007 households had 2.43 asset items, on average; this declined to 2.09 by 2012).  
Thus, the change over time was -0.34.  Over the same time span asset items owned by 
households in treatment communes increased from 2.30 to 2.33, an increase of 0.03.  
Were we to use these data to calculate the difference-in-differences estimator, the 
calculation would be [(2.33 – 2.30) – (2.09 – 2.43)] = 0.37.  Thus, the significant 
positive impact does not necessarily mean that households in the treatment area were 
much better off in 2012 than they were in 2007.  The estimated impact in this case 
should be interpreted as follows: in the absence of treatment, the asset index of 
                                                        
9
 Fixed-effects estimation was implemented via the xtreg command in STATA; estimation accounted for 
the complex sample design (stratification, clustering, and weighting). Outliers, defined as observations 
on the response variable with values greater than four standard deviations from the mean, were deleted 
prior to estimation.   
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treatment households would have decreased by the same amount as for the comparison 
households.  Finally, we see in this case that the controls did not play a very important 
role: the estimated impact is quite close to the ordinary DID calculation.   
For further illustration, examine the results for income from businesses for non-
minorities.  The large negative impact (-22,536) appears to indicate that households in 
the treatment communes are much worse off.  Again, the key interpretation is relative:  
households in the treatment communes saw their incomes from businesses rise from 
22,988 to 28,703 between 2007 and 2012.  However, households in the comparison 
communes enjoyed a much larger average increase: from 21,912 to 48,759.  Thus, 
business incomes of households in the treatment communes failed to grow as rapidly as 
business incomes of counterpart households in comparison communes. 
Minority households recorded statistically significant positive impacts due to 
P135-II for several important variables:  productive asset ownership, household 
durables ownership, and rice productivity.  Among higher-order outcomes, they 
enjoyed positive impacts in income from agriculture, household total income, and 
household per-capita income.  A particularly important result is that poverty among 
minority households in treatment communes declined significantly more than it 
declined in comparison communes. Specifically, for ethnic minority households, P135- 
II increased the rice productivity about 10%, agriculture income about 17%, total 
income of these households about 16%, and then reduce the poverty of ethnic minority 
about 10%. In addition, Program helps to reduce the travel time of ethnic minority 
households to health facilities about 12%.  
In only two instances were estimated impacts for minority households negative.  
First, the value of their corn productivity among households in treatment communes 
increased less than that in comparison communes. but it did increase (from 770 VND 
per square meter to 1,590 VND per square meter compared to an increase from 0.94 
VND per square meter to 1,940 VND per square meter).  In this case we see not only 
did comparison households enjoy a larger increase in the value of their corn 
productivity, they started off at a higher value as well.  A similar description is 
appropriate for the negative impact recorded for the share of land allocated to industrial 
crops. 
Statistically significant positive impacts were recorded for non-minority 
households for their household durables index and for their corn, cassava, and industrial 
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crops productivities.  While the industrial crop productivity increased, the share of land 
allocated to industrial crops decreased.  Perhaps both results were driven by taking the 
least-productive land out of industrial crops production. 
Non-minority households in treatment areas saw their agricultural incomes 
decline while those in comparison areas saw theirs increase: this contrast is reflected in 
the statistically significant impact on income from agriculture.  The statistically 
significant impact on income from businesses was discussed above. 
Finally, the measured travel time to health facilities in treatment communes 
increased.  While it seems unlikely that travel times to specific facilities increased, this 
result could be driven by a shift in the mix of health facilities visited. 
The right-hand panels of Table 8 support two important generalizations.  First, 
in almost all measures the treatment communes were worse off in 2007 than the 
comparison communes.  This is consistent with authorities directing P135-II resources 
to communes most in need. 
Second, non-minority households are better off than minority households in 
several very important respects.  In particular they have lower incomes and lower 
school enrollments.  For both of these, there is evidence of improvement.  Incomes 
increased, but not as much as non-minorities. Enrollments also increased, and by larger 
percentages than for non-minorities. 
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Table 8:  Impact estimation results 
        
Sample Averages 
 
Minorities Non-Minorities 
 
Minorities Non-Minorities 
Response Variable 
DID 
FE/X 
t-
ratio 
p-
value 
DID 
FE/X 
t-
ratio 
p-
value 
 
Treatment Control Treatment Control 
 
2012 2007 2012 2007 2012 2007 2012 2007 
                Asset Index 0.38 2.33 0.0099 0.15 0.88 0.1894 
 
2.33 2.30 2.09 2.43 2.04 1.90 2.14 2.16 
Durables Index 1.18 7.42 0.0000 1.02 2.04 0.0207 
 
7.45 6.58 8.80 9.14 10.90 9.83 11.08 10.78 
House Quality Index 0.01 1.00 0.1587 0.02 1.05 0.1469 
 
0.42 0.38 0.50 0.47 0.57 0.50 0.61 0.54 
                Rice Productivity (kg/sqm) 0.03 2.00 0.0228 0.002 0.07 0.4721 
 
0.37 0.35 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.42 0.41 
Rice Productivity (000 VND/sqm) 0.04 0.41 0.3409 -0.11 -0.48 0.3156 
 
2.38 1.03 2.65 1.26 2.47 1.13 2.69 1.29 
                Corn Productivity (kg/sqm) 0.01 1.10 0.1357 0.03 1.44 0.0749 
 
0.18 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 
Corn Productivity (000 VND/sqm) -0.18 -2.12 0.0170 0.003 0.02 0.4920 
 
1.59 0.77 1.94 0.94 1.99 0.87 2.16 0.94 
                Cassava Productivity (kg/sqm) -0.13 -1.01 0.1562 0.54 2.35 0.0094 
 
1.14 1.26 1.26 1.35 1.64 1.22 1.27 1.21 
Cassava Productivity (000 VND/sqm) -0.16 -0.86 0.1949 0.45 1.69 0.0455 
 
1.43 0.74 1.64 0.83 1.94 0.75 1.69 0.82 
                Industrial Crop Productivity (kg/sqm) -0.01 0.10 0.4602 0.43 1.02 0.1539 
 
0.54 0.51 0.53 0.60 1.58 4.42 1.01 1.43 
Industrial Crop Prod (000 VND/sqm) 0.03 0.02 0.4920 12.54 2.41 0.0080 
 
5.47 2.73 4.06 2.95 17.71 11.20 5.85 4.04 
                Share of Land in Industrial Crops -0.04 -1.32 0.0934 -0.11 -1.91 0.0281 
 
0.18 0.18 0.29 0.21 0.28 0.30 0.23 0.22 
                Income from Wages & Salaries 634 0.19 0.4247 2,985 1.10 0.1357 
 
14,541 11,535 19,578 15,770 25,512 18,596 23,573 18,542 
Income from Agriculture 3,230 3.27 0.0005 -3,285 -1.54 0.0618 
 
19,224 17,446 18,632 18,584 17,039 17,954 16,724 14,774 
Income from Businesses 2,104 0.52 0.3015 -22,536 -2.90 0.0019 
 
14,012 7,597 22,268 12,676 28,703 22,988 48,759 21,912 
                Household Total Income 3,479 2.14 0.0162 -1,644 -0.41 0.3409 
 
31,309 26,634 36,687 33,648 45,123 39,740 45,460 39,460 
Household Per-Capita Income 1,118 2.51 0.0060 121 0.11 0.4562 
 
7,047 5,739 8,174 7,722 12,193 9,829 12,083 9,832 
                Poverty -0.10 -2.72 0.0033 -0.01 -0.17 0.4325 
 
0.49 0.59 0.40 0.42 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.34 
                Enrollment: Primary 0.04 0.97 0.1660 0.04 0.50 0.3085 
 
0.83 0.83 0.93 0.92 0.98 0.92 0.95 0.92 
Enrollment: Lower Secondary 0.02 0.50 0.3085 0.10 0.96 0.1685 
 
0.60 0.58 0.77 0.72 0.78 0.74 0.90 0.89 
Enrollment: Upper Secondary 0.03 0.63 0.2643 -0.03 -0.32 0.3745 
 
0.28 0.24 0.43 0.38 0.53 0.55 0.66 0.68 
                Travel Time to Health Facilities -5.82 -1.69 0.0455 9.67 1.41 0.0793 
 
46.13 43.48 39.09 28.48 48.64 37.11 37.25 62.36 
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 Finally, the fact that we found a number of statistically significant impacts despite 
the fact that overall budget allocations to treatment communes were no different on 
average than those to control communes suggests that the design of P135-II made it more 
effective than other infrastructure support. We conjecture P135-II’s focus on capacity 
building and community participation enhanced its effectiveness. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper aims to evaluate the effectiveness of P135-II. We report the estimated impacts 
of P135-II on several measures of household production and welfare. In particular, we 
report the impacts on poverty status, income, agricultural production, housing conditions, 
and access to basic public services. Our analysis is based on the baseline survey conducted 
in 2007 and the end-line survey conducted in 2012. These surveys constitute the most 
comprehensive and reliable panel data set focusing on ethnic minorities in Vietnam.  
P135-II is the first large government program in Vietnam to adopt a systematic and 
well-designed impact evaluation procedure. During the implementation of P135-II, some 
communes in the treatment group graduated from the program and some communes from 
the control group were brought into the treatment group. These reassignments were not 
part of the original program design and they complicated the impact evaluation task.  We 
were compelled to omit communes that had been reassigned; this reduced the sample size, 
reduced the precision of the estimated impacts, and reduced the power of the necessary 
statistical tests. In addition, we found that the budget allocations of P135-II communes and 
comparison communes were not statistically different. While the treatment communes did 
receive substantially more P135 funds than the control communes received, they also 
received substantially less non-P135 support.  This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis 
of compensatory reallocation of non-P135 funds by the local authorities (district and 
province), which has been confirmed by a recent study.10 The potential impact of P135-II 
depends on the degree to which it enhances resource availability to target communes. The 
                                                        
10
 Effectiveness of Targeted Budget Support in Program 135 Phase II- An Aid Effectiveness Evaluation 
Report. Indochina Research and Consulting, 2011. 
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reallocation non-P135 funds from P135 communes to non-P135 communes to compensate 
the latter because they were not included in P135 created a major difficulty for identifying 
P135 impacts and very likely resulted in underestimating the program impacts.  The fact 
that the P135-II communes actually did not receive more funding than other communes 
undermined the goals of P135: to reduce the widening gap between P135-II communes and 
other communes, the gap between poor and non-poor households, and the gap between 
ethnic minorities and Kinh households. These issues should be addressed and monitored in 
future programs, especially P135-III, to ensure that the allocation of funds to target groups 
does not affect the decisions of local authorities on other resource allocations. 
The estimated impacts on key response variables for minority households are on 
balance positive. The most important results are the large and statistically significant 
impacts on total income, per-capita household income, and poverty status. Results for non-
minority households appear mixed, but impacts on the most important measures (total 
income, per-capita income, and poverty status), are neither large nor statistically 
significant. 
School enrollment is critically important to households and their communities.  
Enrollment rates of minority children are lower than those of non-minorities, especially for 
upper-secondary school.  However, enrollments improved among households in treatment 
and in comparison communes. In all cases but one, enrollments in treatment communes 
increased more than in comparison communes, but the impacts were not statistically 
significant. 
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Appendix 
 Definitions of Key Response Variables 
Household Assets 
 Household Productive Assets Index: 
  =  


∑ 

  ,  
  = 1if household has at least one of asset   , and 0 otherwise; 
 assets are listed in Section 5 of the questionnaire. 
 Household Consumer Durables Index: 
 !" =  

#
∑ $
#
  ,   
 $ = 1if household has at least one of durable   , and 0 otherwise; 
 durables are listed in Section 5 of the questionnaire. 
 Housing Quality Index: 
  %& = (10 − (ℎ*+, + -*+, + **+,../7, where: 
  ℎ*+,:  1 = permanent house 
    2 = semi-permanent house 
    3 = temporary house 
  -*+,: 1 = piped water 
    2 = clean water source 
    3 = other 
  **+,:  1 = flush toilet 
    2 = other toilet 
    3 = no toilet 
  HQI ranges from 1/7 to 1; higher scores indicate “better” houses. 
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Agricultural Productivity 
 Productivity (rice):  
 kilograms per square meter of land allocated to rice production; 
 value of rice produced per square meter of land allocated to rice production. 
 Productivity (corn):  
 kilograms per square meter of land allocated to corn production; 
 value of corn produced per square meter of land allocated to corn 
production. 
 Productivity (cassava):  
 kilograms per square meter of land allocated to cassava production; 
 value of cassava produced per square meter of land allocated to cassava 
production. 
 Productivity (industrial crops):  
 kilograms per square meter of land allocated to industrial crops production; 
 value of industrial crops produced per square meter of land allocated to 
industrial crops production. 
 Share of land allocated to industrial crops. 
Household Income11 
 Income from wages & salaries, thousands of VND per year. 
 Income from agricultural activities, thousands of VND per year. 
 Income from household enterprises, thousands of VND per year.12 
 Household income from all sources, thousands of VND per year. 
 Household income per-capita, thousands of VND per year. 
                                                        
11
   Real values were computed using province-specific deflators to make 2007 and 2012 values comparable. 
12This variable has too few observations for analysis. 
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 Indicator for household poverty status; the indicator = 1 if real per-capita household 
income was below the rural poverty line; 0 otherwise.   
Other Indicators 
 Primary school enrollment rate: the proportion of household’s primary-aged 
children enrolled in school. 
 Lower secondary school enrollment rate: the proportion of household’s lower 
secondary-aged children enrolled in school. 
 Upper secondary school enrollment rate: the proportion of household’s upper 
secondary-aged children enrolled in school. 
 Travel times to schools.13 
 Travel times to health facilities: weighted average of travel times to various 
facilities, with weights proportional to the numbers of visits by household members 
to each type of facility. 
  
                                                        
13
   These variables had insufficient numbers of observations for analysis. 
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Table A1: Differences in P135 Selection Criteria for Control and Treatment 
Communes. 
 
Variable 
Means t-statistic for 
Mean 
Difference 
p-value 
Control Treatment 
Population 3,649 3,454 0.75 0.45 
Poverty Rate 0.60 0.61 -0.56 0.58 
Electricity Available? 0.96 0.85 3.07 0.00 
Market Available? 0.21 0.24 -0.71 0.48 
Irrigation Available? 0.59 0.61 -0.45 0.65 
Road Available? 0.93 0.93 -0.26 0.80 
Culture House Present? 0.24 0.23 0.13 0.90 
Media Station Present? 0.37 0.39 -0.27 0.79 
People’s Committee House Present? 0.57 0.53 0.77 0.44 
Test for distributions of treatment and 
control communes across Vietnam’s 8 
topographic regions. 
 
1(2.
3
 = 9.18 0.24 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
